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 It has been a long-standing aim of analytic ethics to pro-
vide a formal deduction of our moral obligations from non-moral 
premises. Nagel (1971), Korsgaard (1996), and Parfit (1987) have 
all contended that certain facts about the nature of reasons, the 
will, and the self entail that we have moral commitments to our 
fellow human beings. While this line of argumentation is un-
doubtedly valuable in its own right, this paper will attempt to pur-
sue an altogether different approach. Like Korsgaard does in her 
1998 article, it will begin with the instrumental principle 
(Korsgaard 1998). That is where the similarities end, though: ra-
ther than seek, like Korsgaard does, to deduce the various sorts of 
non-instrumental normative commitments that the instrumental 
principle itself requires, I will instead search for the non-
normative facts about the self which are conditions of the instru-
mental principle’s normative validity. This type of transcendental 
argument, which moves from a normative (Though in my case, 
non-moral) principle to the non-normative conditions of this prin-
ciple’s normative validity is best exemplified by Kant’s third an-
tinomy and the question of what notions of freedom are 
“necessary and sufficient for practical use” of our reason. In these 
passages, Kant attempts to argue that the validity of moral princi-
ples require transcendental freedom, and I will similarly attempt 
to argue that the normative validity of the instrumental principle 
requires certain facts about the self to be true. 
  By “normative validity”, I mean simply that a principle 
always gives us reasons which we ought to consider in acting. For 
the instrumental principle to possess this type of validity, I will 
argue that agents must A) be rationally capable of regarding 
themselves as possessing a singular self that reasons, ends, and 
means all belong to (the singularity condition), and B) that they 
must be rationally capable of distinguishing themselves from oth-
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er selves that possess ends (the distinguishability condition). Fur-
thermore, these two conditions must C) actually obtain for the 
instrumental principle to be valid (The reality condition), which 
means that 1) we have a singular self that reasons, ends, and 
means all belong to, and 2) that selves are actually distinct from 
one another.  
 The structure of the paper will be relatively simple. I’ll 
begin with an examination of the instrumental principle and its 
characteristics, then give two transcendental arguments. I’ll then 
discuss the consequences of the arguments I’ve given, and in do-
ing so make a case that the prior two arguments entail that all 
three conditions hold. The paper will conclude with a considera-
tion of the latent incompleteness of its findings.  
 
The Instrumental Principle 
 Formulating a rough-and-ready definition of the instru-
mental principle is surprisingly elusive. One could attempt to de-
fine the principle neatly by appealing to a philosophical giant like 
Kant, but unfortunately there is disagreement over what Kant 
himself meant by a “hypothetical imperative”. Consider his most 
direct formulation: “Whoever wills the end, also wills (insofar as 
reason has decisive influence on his actions) the means that are 
indispensably necessary to it that are in his control” (Kant 2018: 
34). There are commentators who treat this as simply stating an 
analytic truth about the nature of the will (Finlay 2009), and those 
who take it to be a normative requirement on action which we can 
fail to follow (Hill 1970:430). And even amongst those who agree 
with the latter, there is disagreement over whether the hypothet-
ical imperative has narrow or wide scope. Does it tell us, for ex-
ample, that we ought to will the necessary means to our end or 
give that end up (Hill 1970, Darwall 1983), or merely that if we 
have some end, we ought to will the necessary means to that end? 
(Schroeder 2005). Both of these accounts run into problems: the 
former threatens to make the hypothetical imperative into a cate-
gorical one (see Schroeder 2005 for this criticism), and the latter 
runs into counter-examples. Why, after all, must we will the nec-
essary means to our ends when we find out that it’s destructive to 
our entire system of ends, or immoral?  
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 Therefore, Kant cannot provide us with any perfect formu-
lation of the instrumental principle. Indeed, given that the whole 
Kantian notion of the “will” is chock-full of metaphysical bag-
gage, it might be better to avoid his formulations and instead 
speak in the much less controversial language of “reasons”. A 
reason is, roughly, a consideration in favor of acting in a certain 
manner. A decisive reason is one that outweighs all the other rea-
sons. There are many formulations of the instrumental principle 
along these lines (Schroeder 2014, Jollimore 2005, Bratman 
2009). But there’s also dispute. Does the instrumental principle 
counsel that we have reason to do the means that are sufficient for 
some end, or merely those that are necessary? Should we phrase it 
as being about ends we have decisive reasons to carry out, or 
merely those that we have some reason to carry out? Indeed, 
should we speak of ends in the first clause of the instrumental 
principle, or merely reasons? Consider two formulations: 
Instrumental principle 1: When we have an end, we have a reason 
to carry out the means to that end. 
Instrumental principle 2: When we have a reason to do E, we 
have some reason to do what will be a means to E. 
 
 The latter principle eliminates the notion of an end in fa-
vor of having two “reasons”, one in the beginning clause, and one 
in the ending clause. We can call the former reason the “founding 
reason”, and the latter a “derived reason”. I’ll call the reason in 
the ending clause of 1) an instrumental reason. There are differ-
ences between these two principles which can be illustrated by 
some examples. Consider, for example, the case of Jack. Jack is a 
greedy oil mogul whose sole love is for his eldest son, to whom 
he decides to leave all of his inheritance. Many would say that he 
has a reason to give some of his money to the global poor, even if 
this reason is not related to any of his present desires, beliefs, or 
intentions. On this account, since he has a founding reason to do-
nate to the global poor, he has a derived reason to find some char-
ity to give to. Therefore the instrumental principle applies to him 
in formulation 2). In formulation 1), though, Jack doesn’t set any 
end to donate to charity, and he therefore doesn’t have any instru-
mental reason. This seems to be right. After all, if Jack is display-
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ing some type of irrationality here, it would not be in failing to 
follow the instrumental principle, but rather in failing to live up to 
his moral demands. We would only say he was failing to follow 
the instrumental principle if he had already decided he had rea-
sons to give to the global poor (or set an end to give to them), and 
never gave to charity. The proponent of the second principle 
might object that this depends on an externalist account of rea-
sons, and that so long as we suppose that the founding principle 
was internal, we would be fine. I will use Kieran Setiya’s para-
phrase of Williams’ classic position to define internalism: "P is a 
reason for A to x if and only if there is a sound deliberative route 
from A's beliefs, taken together with his subjective motivational 
set and the belief that P, to the desire to x” (Kieran 2004). Now 
consider Jackie, who has a great zest for learning. Her happiness 
and fulfillment would best be served by her becoming a profes-
sor. However, because she has not reflected on the matter at any 
length, she believes she will be better served by going into law. 
She has thus never set as her end the decision to become a profes-
sor. In this case, it is clear that Jackie has no instrumental reason 
to, say, take the GRE’s in order to become a professor, even if it 
would be what best serves her long-term interests. We would not 
judge her instrumentally irrational in failing to take the GRE’s. It 
seems, however, that principle 2) implies that we ought to. So 
that’s another count against 2). There is, however, a trivial sense 
in which 2) is true. If we have a reason, whether external or inter-
nal, to do some action, then we do indeed have a reason to carry 
out the means to that action. But this isn’t a version of the instru-
mental principle, since it doesn’t really make sense to say an indi-
vidual is instrumentally incoherent in failing to follow it. So we 
ought to adopt 1).  Of course, there are other disputes that might 
be pertinent. One might wonder whether it’s better to add the pre-
fix “necessary” or “sufficient” to means. And of course, the defi-
nition writ large could be made more complex to rule out various 
counter-examples. But I’m going with a simple definition here, 
because I want to show that even with the most primitive notion 
of the instrumental principle, fairly significant conclusions can be 
deduced.  
 It’s also worth noting two key elements of this new defini-
tion of the instrumental principle: the transmission relation, and 
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the necessary structure of that relation. The former can be made 
evident by examining the internal structure of the instrumental 
principle. We only have an instrumental reason to perform means 
because that means is related in a proper way qua means to a giv-
en end. There might be some other reason to perform some means 
(say, if that means was the right thing to do in some specific situ-
ation), but that would not be an instrumental reason. It is only be-
cause of this relation to ends - as things we value, desire, or have 
reason to want - that we have reason to engage in actions we 
would qualify as ‘means’. That is why we speak of a 
“transmission”: by virtue of the relationship between ends and 
means, the end transmits to the means a reason to perform it. This 
should always happen. If it doesn’t, the problem will be with our 
phrasing of the instrumental principle, not with the instrumental 
principle itself.  
 This is why there is a necessary structure to the transmis-
sion relation. Although it is contingent matter that we have adopt-
ed a certain end, it is a matter of necessity that once the ends and 
means are determined, the ends transmit to the means a reason to 
perform them. If this was not a necessity, then it would seem to 
be a contingent, empirical circumstance that once the ends and 
means are fixed, the ends transmit to an agent a reason to perform 
a means, which would be simply bizarre. This would mean that 
one could give counter-examples to some given version of the 
instrumental principle, and a suitable rebuttal would be to merely 
point out that the instrumental principle can of course fail to 
transmit reasons from ends to means, since it isn’t necessary. But 
that’s not what the counter-examples show: they demonstrate, 
rather, that some phrasing of the instrumental principle is insuffi-
cient since ends don’t necessarily transmit reasons to means. 
 This allows us to rephrase the instrumental principle in the 
following manner: “When some x has an end, that same x neces-
sarily has a reason to carry out the means to that end”. In the fol-
lowing two arguments, I will use this formulation of the instru-
mental principle. I will also use the variable ‘X’ instead of our 
generic concept of a person, because less metaphysical baggage 
comes with it.  
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The Ownership Argument 
 Note an interesting formal fact about the instrumental 
principle: it is only valid if a given X possesses various ends.  X 
having a reason to do end a gives Z no instrumental reason to do 
b if it will serve as a means to end a, unless Z already has end a. 
Of course, Z might have a moral reason to set end a as their own, 
but this would not give them the instrumental reason to will the 
means b to end a unless they have already adopted end a. More 
concretely, if Jack wants to go biking, Jill has no instrumental 
reason to buy Jack a bike unless she is already in some way con-
cerned with Jack’s pursuits, or decided to act on a moral consider-
ation. In other words, Jill has no instrumental reason to buy Jack a 
bike unless she already has set an end that will be fulfilled by 
buying Jack a bike. Another example, with less of an explicitly 
moral valence, might be more illustrative. Consider Jackie. Alt-
hough she would be best served by becoming a professor, she has 
decided she wants to enter law. Without having set the end to be-
come a professor, she has no instrumental reason to take the 
GRE’s, even though it is what best serves her interests. This 
demonstrates that for an X to have any particular instrumental 
reason, that same agent must have some end.  
 Another way to speak of this is in terms of the transmis-
sion relation. Instrumental reasons get their normative force from 
their relation to ends. It is not enough, however, that these ends 
be just anybody’s. These ends have to be one’s own in order for 
them to grant instrumental reasons. As we have seen with both 
Jackie and Jill, their moral and prudential reasons to set various 
ends do not grant them analogous instrumental reasons to actually 
accomplish those ends unless they have actually followed the 
counsel of these principles and set various ends as their own. One 
can, of course, consider everyone else’s end as one’s own (the 
Kantian does something like this in the Kingdom of Ends), but 
this serves to exemplify, not nullify, the requirement that we must 
have ends as our own in order to deduce instrumental reasons for 
them.  
 For the transference relation to go through, then, an X 
must be capable of conceiving of an end as their own. And to 
conceive of an end as one’s own is to conceive of it as belonging 
to you, rather than some other X. What this “you” or “self” is we 
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cannot say at this point, but it seems fair to claim that this strange 
X possesses ends that can be distinguished from other X’s that 
have ends. This is not to say that the ends must be distinct 
(indeed, in the case of the Kingdom of Ends, they might be pre-
cisely the same), but the thing that possesses these ends must be 
conceived of as distinct if the instrumental principle is to go 
through. If we were not capable of distinguishing the thing that 
possesses these ends from other things that possess ends, we 
would not know when a given end is our own or another’s, and 
thus the instrumental principle would not be valid since we could 
not confidently say when a given end is our own. And if we could 
not confidently say when an end is our own or another’s, the in-
strumental principle would not necessarily transmit reasons from 
ends to means. There’s also a conceptual argument to be made: it 
would be entirely insensible to say of some end that it was your 
“own” if you were not readily distinguishable from other selves. 
In that way, the very concept of “ownness” presupposes the dis-
tinguishability condition, because without the capacity to distin-
guish ourselves from other selves we wouldn’t be able of know-
ing if an end was “our own” or another’s.  
 
The Unity Argument 
 The instrumental principle explicitly involves three essen-
tial elements: means, ends, and reasons. Let us say a means is 
something some X must do in order to achieve an end. Let us de-
note this X as an ‘actor’. The foregoing argument demonstrates 
that we must have ends that are our own if the instrumental prin-
ciple is to be normatively valid. Let’s call the X which possesses, 
or conceives of ends as its own the ‘agent’. Now we can formu-
late the instrumental principle as “Whenever some agent possess-
es an end y there is reason for an actor to do whatever is a means 
z to that end”. There is a striking problem with this formulation: 
if the actor and the agent are conceived of as having different ref-
erents, there is no reason to suppose that the transference relation 
necessarily holds between end y and means x. If the actor was not 
identical to the agent, then the actor might not possess the ends 
that the agent possesses, which means that it would not necessari-
ly have any instrumental reason for doing some means since it 
would not be a means to its own end. Thus the actor that is 
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viewed as having a reason to do some means must be regarded as 
numerically identical to the agent that has an end. 
 We can replay this argument by considering the X that has 
reasons. Some might doubt that any X ‘has’ reasons. If we do as-
sume internalism (about reasons, not principles), reasons must be 
capable of having some degree of motivational force. They must, 
in Korsgaard’s words (Korsgaard 1996: 85), be capable of 
“getting a grip” on some X. A reason must be a reason for some 
specific X if it is to have the requisite motivational force. For 
some philosophers ((Parfit 1987) and (Scanlon 2000)), though, 
reasons are simply things that are out there, waiting to be discov-
ered. But even in this case, it is clear that these reasons must be ca-
pable of being relevant for various X’s. Let us call this x that is capable of hav-
ing reasons be relevant for it an ‘author’. Now we can rephrase the instrumen-
tal principle “Whenever some agent has an end y, there is a reason x for an 
author to do whatever is an actor’s means z to that end”.  
 It ought to be abundantly clear that if we do not conceive 
of the agent, the author, and the actor as numerically identical, the 
instrumental principle will be burst asunder. The entity that the 
reasons are relevant for must be regarded as the same entity that 
possesses ends and that is capable of having means to certain 
ends. If the author that has reasons was different than the agent 
that has ends and the actor that has means, then it would not be 
necessary that the agent and actor have the same reasons as the 
author, since they would be different entities. But this clearly is 
necessary for the instrumental principle to hold: if the instrumen-
tal principle did not give the actor or agent reasons, then the in-
strumental principle would not be normative for them at all, since 
it would not provide them with actual reasons that tell them that 
they ought to act in a particular manner.  
We can also flip this around and consider matters from the 
perspective of the author that has reasons, but is non-identical to 
the agent that has ends and the actor that has means. In this case, 
they would have certain reasons, but we couldn’t call these rea-
sons properly instrumental since they would not necessarily serve 
to fulfill its own ends: they might have altogether different ends 
given their non-identity with the agent. But this necessity clearly 
is a part of the instrumental principle, as we’ve argued earlier. 
Therefore the entity, whatever it is, that responds to reasons must 
be conceived as the same entity that has ends. Otherwise, this X 
62 
 Ends and Persons 
that responds to reasons would not necessarily have a reason to 
fulfill the ends of the agent, since it does not necessarily possess 
these ends as its own, which is a requirement for the validity of 
the instrumental principle. Thus we can say that for the transfer-
ence relation to hold, we must regard the same X as responding to 
reasons, having ends, and possessing means to those ends. Let us 
denote this a ‘self’. 
 
What the Two Arguments Show 
 There are two possible objections to the arguments I’ve 
given thus far. One line of response is that what I’ve shown is 
merely how we must regard ourselves if we are bound by the in-
strumental principle, since transcendental arguments serve only to 
illustrate what we must believe to be true and not what is actually 
the case (Stroud 1968: 255). This comports well with an anti-
realist theory of principle validity, in which principles are norma-
tively valid if agents hold certain kinds of attitudes and beliefs. In 
this case, what I’ve shown is just what configuration of beliefs 
and attitudes are necessary for the instrumental principle’s validi-
ty - but I haven’t shown that those beliefs must actually be true. 
  The other response pushes in the other direction. Isn’t it 
the case that the instrumental principle is binding on us regardless 
of whether we consider ourselves to be unified and distinguisha-
ble selves? On a realist account of practical principles, that cer-
tainly might be right. Let’s say a realist account of practical prin-
ciples is one that holds that the desires, beliefs, and attitudes of 
any given agent are totally irrelevant to the validity of a given 
practical principle. Rather, what makes a certain normative prin-
ciple valid is certain non-normative, agent-neutral facts that serve 
to “ground” a principle. Let’s say that a proposition “grounds” a 
principle if the principle will be normatively invalid if the propo-
sition is false. In this case, my arguments can be interpreted as 
offering a proof that the instrumental principle is grounded by 
various propositions. After all, if we did in fact not have unified 
and distinguishable selves, it would be very difficult to make 
sense of the instrumental principle’s validity on a realist account. 
For the transmission relation to be necessary, there needs to be an 
identity between the X that has reasons, ends, and means. Simi-
larly, for agents to have instrumental reasons to act on their ends, 
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these ends need to be their own and not of others, which means 
selves need to be distinguished from each other. If either of these 
conditions did not actually obtain, the instrumental principle 
wouldn’t be valid, since the transmission relation would break-
down. The realist account thus allows us to effectively fast-track 
our way to the reality condition.  
 What about the singularity and distinguishability condi-
tions? These hold merely that agents must be capable of distin-
guishing themselves and holding themselves to be singular selves. 
It is thus unrelated to the actual beliefs and desires of any current 
agent, and hence is perfectly acceptable on a realist account. And 
I think, too, that there are compelling reasons for a realist to want 
to accept these conditions. Let’s say that a principle 
“presupposes” a belief if the agent must hold that belief if they 
are to rationally accept the principle as normatively valid 
(regardless of whether it actually is). Hopefully, I’ve shown that 
the distinguishability and singularity conditions are presupposed 
in this way. If we are to rationally hold that the instrumental prin-
ciple has normative validity, we must in turn view ourselves as 
having unified and distinguishable selves. Now consider the prin-
ciple “ought implies can” (hereafter OIC). Following Johnny 
Anomaly’s article on the philosophical forum, OIC claims that no 
act "can be morally required if it is beyond human capacities to 
perform” (Anomaly 2008: 480) Reformulated to apply to princi-
ples, OIC claims that no principle can be normatively valid if it is 
impossible for human beings to rationally regard the principle as 
being valid. In other words, if we cannot regard it as being valid, 
it cannot be valid, since it could never be normative for us. For a 
principle to be normatively valid, it must be capable of rationally 
guiding human action (Anomaly 2008:480, from Griffin 1992) - 
but if we cannot rationally accept the grounds on which that prin-
ciple rests, then the principle will not be capable of rationally 
guiding our action.  
 If the realist rejected the distinguishability and singularity 
conditions, they would in effect be rejecting ought implies can. If 
agents were not capable of viewing themselves as singular and 
distinguishable selves, they would not be capable of rationally 
regarding the instrumental principle as valid. This would entail 
the bizarre position that the instrumental principle is normatively 
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valid yet simultaneously agents are incapable of rationally regard-
ing such a principle to be valid. While I can’t say this is surely 
incorrect, I think our intuitions (as well as the principle of ought-
implies-can) speak strongly against it.  
 How about the anti-realist position? On this account, I’ve 
shown merely that we need to accept certain facts to believe that 
the instrumental principle is normatively valid, but not that these 
facts must actually be true. The best argument I can give against 
this position is by example. Let’s suppose that the prudential prin-
ciple ‘presupposes’ the existence of a continuously existing self. 
Now assume that such a self can be demonstratively shown to not 
exist, and that Johnathan labors under the delusion that it does. Is 
the principle of prudence normatively valid for Johnathan? It 
makes most sense to say that he might regard this principle as 
normatively valid, but that it lacks real normative force because it 
is based on false assumptions. Another example might make this 
more lucid. Suppose that moral principles require the existence of 
other agents who feel pain, but there are in fact, no agents like 
that which exist. Johnathan lives in a solipsist world, where his 
peers are all elaborate automatons. But he mistakenly believes 
them to be real persons. Is the moral principle truly normatively 
valid in this case? Johnathan might believe it to be normatively 
valid, but surely it is not a principle that he ought to act on, all 
things considered. And let’s consider, lastly, our own case. There 
is no self that has ends, means, and responds to reasons. At any 
given moment, we are inhabited by multiple selves, one of whom 
has an end, and another whom has a reason. If an agent errone-
ously labors under the belief that this is not the case and employs 
the instrumental principle, they are doing so by a sort of mistake. 
In this case, the instrumental principle is clearly not normatively 
valid, though an agent might mistakenly regard it to be so. There-
forre, for the instrumental principle to have normative validity, 
the beliefs which are presupposed by it must be true. This estab-
lishes the reality condition and concludes our proof of the tran-
scendental presuppositions of the instrumental principle’s validi-
ty. For we have shown on both realist and anti-realist accounts of 
principle validity that the instrumental principle is valid.  
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The Nature of the Self 
 This paper is incomplete. It specifies several conditions 
that must be fulfilled for the instrumental principle to be valid, 
but does not explain how they are to be fulfilled. There is a mas-
sive literature on self-reference, personal identity and self-
consciousness I have neglected to engage with here (see Cas-
taneda 1966, Shoemaker 1968, Perry 1979, and Kaplan 1989, bib-
liography of Gertler 2015, Olson 2015, and Smith 2017) which 
might explain how the various conditions might be true. That is a 
project worth pursuing.  
 There’s another sense in which the argument of this paper 
is incomplete. So far, I’ve examined only the presuppositions of 
instrumental reason. I began with the thinnest principle of rational 
action because its validity commands the broadest philosophical 
assent. If Korsgaard is right, however, that the instrumental prin-
ciple cannot be the sole requirement on practical reason, then our 
analysis here is drastically incomplete (Korsgaard 2008). An ex-
amination of the transcendental conditions of the instrumental 
principle must give way to an investigation of the conditions for 
prudential and moral principles. Of course, this project is far be-
yond the scope of this paper. But it is one that I hope I have pro-
vided a preparatory sketch for in the present work. 
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1. See Longuenesse, (2017: 152). (Longuenesse 2017) 
2. Gareth Evans’ notion of fundamental identification is close to 
this (See Roos 2004).  
3. This serves to demonstrate that prudential is a different species 
of practical rationality than instrumental reason. Nagel argues 
against the opposing view in The Possibility of Altruism (2008).  
4. See Kiesewetter’s article (2015) on the transmission relation 
for a defense of the very specific form of the transmission princi-
ple that we rejected earlier.  
5. Kant Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and Wood 
Kant’s ethical Thought (1999: xx).  
6. On the Kantian formulation, it involves means, ends, and a 
will. On other formulations, it involves ends, means, and an 
“ought” statement. This is how Mathew Bedkey (2009) formu-
lates it. Ultimately, this latter formulation is not very different 
from ours, since an “ought-statement” can be generally translated 
into a “reason-giving” one.  
7. For a response to Korsgaard’s arguments against externalism, 
see Shaver (2006).  
8. It is worth distinguishing between the ontological status of rea-
sons and their normative status. That is, reasons might very well 
be the sort of things that can have normative command over us 
only if they can motivate us, but also exist, in some sense, inde-
pendently of agents. Conversely, reasons can have unrestricted 
normative command over us as agents but also be dependent on 
the existence of agents for their existence. I think this latter view 
comes closest to the Kantian one, though Korsgaard would, of 
course, dispute this. It’s also clear that it’s at least potentially 
possible to argue from normative internalism or externalism to 
their ontological correlate. This relation of logical entailment 
doesn’t mean that the positions are identical, though.  
9. To see a response to Stroud’s article against transcendental ar-
guments, consult (Stern 2000).  
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